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PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.
La Doctrine de Spinoza exposee et commentce a la lumi'ere des fails
scientifiques. Par EMILE FERRIERE. Paris, Felix Alcan, Editeur.
Pp. ix + 357.
The list of works already published by M. Ferriere reveals a
catholicity of tastes and interests rather depressing to the man who
feels that he can do good work only by circumscribing the sphere
of his activities and becoming more or less of a specialist. Darwin-
ism, The Medicinal Plants of Burgundy, The Apostles, Paganism
among the Hebrews, Scientific Errors in the Bible, Biblical Myths,
The Soul and the Functions of the Brain, Matter and Energy, Life and
Mind,—these are among the subjects upon which he has found it
possible to write ' unfort volume.1 From a work on the etymology
of four hundred Christian names used in France, he passes to a study
of Spinozism. He admits frankly that it will appear strange in the
eyes of the general public that, at the close of a century devoted ex-
clusively to money and material pleasures, a man should be found so
devoid of sense as to devote himself to philosophy, above all to
Spinozism; but, he exclaims, with a noble indifference to con-
sequences, " cela me laisse tout a fait indifferent." The theories of
Spinoza are to be condensed into a few propositions, stripped of all
obscurity, and so placed before the reader that a ' coup d'oeil' will
suffice to reveal both the details and the system in which they find their
unity. At the same time a running commentary will turn upon the
Spinozistic doctrine the searching light of contemporary science.
But even a cursory examination of this volume will suffice to con-
sole those who feel sensitive regarding their inability to write treatises
on Darwinism, the Apostles, the virtues of Medicinal Plants, and the
Scientific Errors of the Bible. M. Ferriere need feel no apprehen-
sion lest those, who are in a position to judge, accuse him of having
devoted an inordinate amount of time to the study of philosophy. His
material he has gotten largely from Saisset, and he has not improved
it in working it over. From Spinoza himself it is clear that he has
gotten little, and he has largely misunderstood that little. Of the
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philosophies which preceded- Spinozism, and without an under-
standing of which it is impossible to follow intelligently the reason-
ings contained in the ' Ethics'—of these, M. Ferriere is palpably
ignorant.
The puzzling question of the relation of substance to its attributes,
a question over which students of Spinozism have expended no little
thought, M. Ferriere settles summarily with an illustration, a ' fait
scientifique.' Plaster is composed of sulphuric acid and lime. Here
we have a case of substance and attributes. Suppose an infinite uni-
verse of plaster; the lime may be regarded as representing the attribute
extension, and the sulphuric acid as representing the attribute thought.
The combination of the two gives us the one substance with its attri-
butes. Voila tout! (pp. 29-30). Attributes are the elements of which
substance is composed (p. 32). The difficulty of making plaster of
any sort out of such diverse elements as extension and thought were
conceived to be in the seventeenth century does not present itself as a
difficulty to M. Ferriere's mind. Again, modes are distinguished
from attributes in that they are necessarily finite (p. 44). Did M.
Ferriere ever read Letter 64 in Spinoza's correspondence? Has he
pondered over the significance of the ' fixed and eternal things' of the
treatise ' De Intellectus Emendatione'? Still again, it is insisted that
Spinoza was an out and out nominalist (pp. 63-73), an<^ a s *-he Spin-
ozistic doctrine of essences is quite overlooked, it is but natural that
M. Ferriere should be wholly at sea when he comes to discuss the
immortality of the mind. It seems to him that, in this doctrine, Spin-
oza has arbitrarily stepped beyond the limits of his system, and simply
taken up with the beliefs of the vulgar (p. 128). To one who reads
Spinoza in this way, the ' Ethics' is and must remain a sealed book, a
mere mass of incoherencies.
It is not necessary to criticize M. Ferriere's volume in detail. There
is a scientific side to the Spinozistic philosophy which is well worthy
of attention even in our day; but it cannot be properly treated by one
who has never penetrated Spinoza's thought at all, and whose book
fairly bristles with statements which can be categorically denied by
citations from Spinoza's writings. If the volume on the Medicinal
Plants of Burgundy contains as many errors as this one, it must have
been the unhappy occasion of many a colic and of much Gallic pro-
fanity. As for the Apostles, if they have been misrepresented as
has Spinoza, they have just grounds for an action at law against the
author.
G. S. F.
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La Nouvelle Monadologie. CH. RENOUVIER et L. PRAT. Paris,
Colin et Cie. 1899. Pp. 546.
Of the dual authorship of this work it would be difficult to find
any evidence in the work itself beyond the title-page: the hand may
be the hand of Prat, but the voice is the voice of Renouvier. At the
close of a long life, the accomplished and venerated master of an in-
fluential philosophical school sums up, in collaboration with one of his
disciples, the positive elements of his teaching in a compact system.
Such appears to be the historical significance of this important treat-
ise : it contains the constructive doctrine of the French critical phi-
losophy.
This doctrine allies itself by its very title with the 'dogmatic' met-
aphysics of Leibnitz. In spite of the many elements derived from
Kant, the method is also to a large extent what Kant would have re-
garded as dogmatic. The groundwork of the system, closely examined,
is the affirmation of the theses, to the exclusion of the antitheses, of
the Kantian antinomies. Thus it is held (1) that the world is com-
posed of simple substances; (3) that it is finite; (3) that it contains
free agents ; and (4) that it originated in the creative act of a supreme
First Cause. And the logical principle on which each of these propo-
sitions rests is that which essentially underlies Kant's argument for
each of the theses of his antinomies, namely, the impossibility of
thinking the actual number of terms in any given series as infinite.
It is impossible, however, to accept these results on this ground.
The abstract principle is indeed unassailable: an actual number can-
not be infinite. But this principle, when applied to the series of con-
ditions thought of as determining any conditioned element in experi-
ence, conflicts, as Kant showed in the arguments for the antitheses,
with another, the necessity, namely, of always going beyond any given
term n of the series to the next, n + 1. Now our authors, following
Aristotle, explain the appearance of an antinomy here by distinguish-
ing between the actual and the possible number; thus, we are told,
the number of actual events which have occurred in the world is finite,
but there is no assignable limit to the number which may hereafter
take place. But why not ? If time can have a beginning, it may also
have an end. The possibility, therefore, of an endless succession of
events in the future is not real and concrete, but merely the abstract
possibility of thinking the progressive series continually added to. But
this is precisely the case with the regressive synthesis of past events
as conditions for any given event. For it is impossible to conceive of
any- event, however remote, as without a precedent event as its condi-
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tion. Our authors deny this: the cause of an event, they say, need
not be an antecedent event. But even granting that there are causes
of events which are not events at all, neither antecedent nor coexist-
ing, that which determines any event to its place in the time-series
must be an antecedent event; for time, in its aspect of succession, is
merely the abstraction of the succession of events. If we think of
the time before any given event as empty, if, e. £:, we try to think of
a first event, we hypostasize an abstraction; and the same difficulty
occurs if we try to think of the beginning of time, for the first begin-
ning of time would be itself an event. Our authors object that to
think the series of past events as infinite is to suppose them illusory,
which is repugnant to good sense. But surely it is the nature of the
reality of the time-series which, among other things, this dilemma of
thought brings in question.
Two cardinal ideas in the system are individuality and freedom.
The existence of simple substances is regarded as a datum implied in
the existence of compound substances. It is rightly inferred that a
simple substance cannot be extended; hence it is determined as a
monad by internal or qualitative relations. But what is the ground of
the argument from the existence of compound substances as given to
the existence of simple substances as also given? Not, surely, the cor-
relativity of the terms, for on that ground we might also conclude from
the existence of the relative the existence of the absolute, an inference
which the authors reject. Hence the logical ground can only be, it
would seem, here as in the previous case, the impossibility of thinking
an actual series unlimited—the argument for the thesis of the second
antinomy. But what compound substances are taken as given ? Surely
not substances compounded of monads, for this would beg the whole
metaphysical question. Extended substances, then, /. «., bodies. But if
bodies are held to be compound substances, it is because they are re-
garded as composed, not of immaterial entities, but of smaller bodies.
And this leads to the endless series—the argument of the antithesis.
The same principle—the contradiction in the conception of an in-
finite series—is urged in support of the doctrine of freedom, and also
in support of what might seem to imperil it, the doctrine of a creative
First Cause. But in the matter of freedom, at any rate, the authors ad-
vance beyond this argument; for, after defending ably and at length
the possibility of freedom, as over against universal mechanical deter-
minism, they finally assert the fact of freedom as a ' rational belief'
motived by its appeal to the sentiment of duty and the interests attach-
ing to personality. This puts the belief on substantially the Kantian
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foundation. The discussion would have gained by a clearer exposi-
tion at the outset of the conception of freedom, which seems to fluc-
tuate between that of an originative, absolutely spontaneous, cause of
phenomena, the power of contrary choice and the hegemonic function
of the intelligence. But probably all three moments are meant to be
included.
The above are among the principal topics discussed in the earlier
parts of the book, entitled respectively, The Monad, Organization,
Mind, Passion and Will. Towards the end of the last named part the
' rational belief in freedom and morality is connected in the practical
reason with the belief in goodness and in individual and social ideals
and is made the ground of belief in the moral perfection of God. This
leads to the discussions in the remaining parts under the headings,
Societies and Justice. The central theme here is the contradiction
between the above-mentioned beliefs and the actual order of things in
our experience. The pessimistic aspects of the world are depicted
with startling effect. It is maintained that this world is radically in-
compatible with the realization of our ideals, that a perfect society on
earth is not merely morally, but physically, impossible, no matter how
long time we allow. But a world thus unjust in its very constitution
cannot, it is held, be the work of a perfect Creator. The problem
then is to explain this present so evil world in agreement with the
principles of the monadology and with the postulates of the practical
reason. The theory advanced is in substance as follows: The monads
were originally created perfect and formed together a perfect world.
There was no superfluous unorganized matter, but only such as was
necessary to supply the needs of organisms, and the physical medium
in which the latter lived was an elastic fluid of a density appropriate
to their use. The physical forces were disposable in the most useful
manner at the will of man. The families of men possessed the high-
est social organization, and, except perhaps in the case of plants, there
was neither generation nor decay. This state of things was brought
to an end by the selfish exercise of free-will. This destroyed not only
the social, but the physical harmony. The evil, small at first, gradu-
ally grew, till at length, in a war of titans, the primitive world went
to smash. The nebulous matter with which our present world begins
was the result of this stupendous break-up. In this matter were con-
tained the germs of the later developed organisms, psychically one
with the monads of the earlier time. Subject to the laws of the new
order, subject to birth and death and to all manner of physical and
social inequalities, the human race is here suffering retribution and
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undergoing discipline. The justice in each individual life must be
assumed, but cannot be seen because of the complexity of the condi-
tions, past, present and future. The process of retribution and edu-
cation is to continue, here or elsewhere, till, in the remote future,
timed presumably to the completion of the work, the catastrophe fore-
seen by science brings to a close the present world-order in an immense
conflagration. Then " new heavens and a new earth wherein dwell-
eth righteousness," Such is the authors' conception of the drama of
the world as it is unfolding itself through the acts of free agents in
accordance with the consciously predetermined creative plan.
Comment on this conception, the likeness and contrast of which
both to the Leibnitzian Theodicy and to the views current in orthodox
Christian theology are manifest, would here seem to be superfluous.
The surprising thing is that all this audacious speculation should be
made to appear as reasonable as it does. Some of its most startling
features seem to follow as legitimate deductions from the principles
developed in the earlier part of the work, while others present them-
selves as plausible interpretations of many of the facts of experience.
But this is very different from a metaphysics that moves in the sure
path of science. Speculatively, the radical defect of the scheme seems
to be that God and the created monads are brought into no sort of in-
timate relation. A finite number of monads created a vast number of
ages ago are left to work out, without miracle, their own destiny.
Why, under the given terms, God should not interpose on occasion, is
not evident. If, on the other hand, God is thus otiose so far as the
destinies of the world are concerned, it is not apparent why he is
needed in the scheme of things at all. Why not regard the monads
as individually eternal beings ? The truth, however, is that the method
by which the monads are themselves posited is vitiated at the start by
dogmatic assumptions. It refuses to accept the lesson of the antino-
mies and it ignores the method of transcendentalism. But this latter
method also has not succeeded in convincing the world that it leads to
the solution of the ultimate question concerning the relation of the
universe to the individual, of the one to the many, and in the end it
must be confessed that a book like this, which is honest and able, con-
tributes to our interest both in philosophy and in life, even though we
may believe that our best hope of results lies along other paths of in-
vestigation. It will at least help to stimulate the new interest in per-
sonality.
H. N. GARDINEK.
SMITH
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Interpretation Sociale et Morale des principes du De'veloppcment
Mental—£tude dc Psycho-Sociologie. J. M. BALDWIN.
Traduit sur la seconde edition anglaise par G. L. DUPRAT.
Paris, Giard & Briere. 1899. Pp. vi + 580.
This is a translation of Professor Baldwin's ' Social and Ethical
Interpretations.' It is, indeed, to be regretted that Professor Baldwin's
remarkable work should have gone into French at the hands of so
careless an interpreter as M. Duprat appears to be. His knowledge
of the English language does not seem very thorough. We have no-
ticed, in fact, gross mistakes in the translation. To give one instance,
M. Duprat translates ' fruste' for ' c rude ' (p. 9), which is just the
contrary of what the author means ( 'crude' means immature and
'fruste' worn out). We have noticed words which are not French,
e. g., 'reflexive' for 'reflective' (pp. 217, 219, 241 et passim).
In various places the author's thought is so obscured that one must
turn to the original in order to understand what is meant. M.
Duprat has also a peculiar way of solving the difficulty of render-
ing into readable French the somewhat complex style of Professor
Baldwin; he suppresses entire passages. We have noticed that in
different parts of the book.
Why has the title of the book—already somewhat lengthy in
English—been ' stuffed ' with superfluous words in the translation,
thus rendering it longer and less comprehensible ? Is not ' Aspect
Ethique et Sociale du D6 veloppement Mental' a simpler and clearer
way of rendering the original title in French than ' Interpretation
Sociale et Morale des principes du Developpement Mental ' ? The
reader will easily see that the word ' principes' is superfluous and
misleading.
As is usual with European books, especially French, there is no
index, and the original contents table has been shortened to indicate
only the heads of the chapters, suppressing any mention of the sections
as given in the American edition. This means unavoidable and vexa-
tious delays in the perusal of the book.
In conclusion, we do not believe that this poor translation will
help to vulgarize Professor Baldwin's doctrines among French
students. Doubtless, many of them will find the author's English
more intelligible than M. Duprat's French. Decidedly, M. Duprat
is just the kind of translator to whom the Italian epigram might be
applied: " Traduttore, traditore."
GUSTAVO TOSTI .
NEW YORK CITY.
